DHS issues cross-sector AI roles framework for critical infrastructure

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has introduced a Roles and Responsibilities Framework for Artificial Intelligence in Critical Infrastructure, described as the first of its kind to cover all 16 critical infrastructure sectors. As reported in a Homeland Security Today analysis, the framework spans five stakeholder roles and three core vulnerability categories: (1) attacks using AI as a weapon, (2) attacks targeting AI systems themselves (including agents and models), and (3) AI design and implementation failures. The framework explicitly calls out agentic systems as a class requiring dedicated risk handling, recognizing that agents often act autonomously and can interface with operational technology and safety-critical processes.

The DHS guidance is emerging alongside joint CISA and allied-nation recommendations for secure AI integration in OT environments, with specific focus on AI agents that can directly control physical processes. These documents converge on several concrete expectations: implement robust prompt injection defenses; institute documented human-override mechanisms for consequential or safety-relevant decisions; require audit logging of all autonomous agent actions; and use isolation architectures (e.g., segmented networks, hardened interfaces, constrained tool scopes) to limit downstream damage if an agent or its tools are compromised.

What changed. AI and agent governance for critical infrastructure is no longer purely advisory—DHS has defined explicit roles and categories of responsibility that operators are expected to consider for deployment and oversight.

Why it matters. Builders of agentic systems that touch energy, healthcare, finance, transportation, and other regulated sectors will increasingly be evaluated against these frameworks by CISOs, regulators, and auditors.

Builder takeaway. When designing or pitching an agentic solution into any critical or regulated environment, align your threat models and controls to DHS’s three vulnerability categories, and be prepared to show concrete mechanisms for human override, auditability, segregation of duties, and safe tool access.